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Abstract: This paper deals with the solution to vertical expenditure externalities in
a federation with two levels of government sharing taxes. Under these circumstances,
the Nash equilibrium does not satisfy the condition for production eﬃciency in the
provision of public inputs. This vertical expenditure externality is removed when the
federal government, behaving as Stackelberg leader, chooses the optimal tax rate on labor
income. The sign of this tax rate depends on the elasticity of marginal productivity of
the public input with respect to employment. Moreover, the previous result concerning
both vertical (tax and expenditure) externalities are independent each other is conﬁrmed
here.
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  1 Introduction
The study of interactions between diﬀerent levels of goverment has been traditionally
focussed on vertical tax externalities. As is well-known, they arise when taxes of one level
of government aﬀect the tax revenues of another level of government. The origin of it lies
in the federal version of the problem of commons, which usually leads to over-explotation
of tax bases and to excessively high taxes. A number of papers has dealt with the
eﬃciency implications coming from this issue, highlighting its consequences on ﬁscal gap
(Boadway and Keen, 1996; Kotsogiannis and Martínez, 2007), the diﬀerences between
Leviathan or benevolent governments (Flowers, 1988; Johnson, 1991), the existence of
heterogeneous agents and redistribution (Boadway et al., 1998) or the qualiﬁcations
w h i c hh a v et ob ed o n ew h e nﬁscal competition at horizontal level is considered as well
(Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002).
By contrast, vertical expenditure externalities have been less studied. These sit-
uations appear when the expenditure decided by one level of government aﬀect others
levels of governments’ revenues. The case of productivity-enhancing public spending
(say, public infrastructure) is a good example of this. The highway built by a state
government has a clear impact on productivity of production factors and, consequently,
on tax revenues levied by federal and local authorities. While in the case of vertical
tax externalities the usual result is overtaxation (compared to the second-best outcome
achieved in a unitary country), things are not so clear when vertical expenditure exter-
nalities are involved. Indeed, public inputs have a positive eﬀect on labor productivity
and hence on income taxes, but the proﬁt tax base may either increase or decrease,
aﬀecting ambiguously federal and local tax revenues based on rents.
Dahlby (1996) ﬁnds that the federal government can solve vertical expenditures
externalities providing a matching grant to states equal to the additional federal revenue
that is generated from one dollar spent by states on productivity-enhancing expenditures.
Dahlby and Wilson (2003) show how the government providing the public input may
over-estimate or under-estimate the marginal beneﬁt, leading to an ineﬃcient provision.
To undo this externality and replicate the second-best outcome, they propose to oﬀer
the state governments a matching grant which is deﬁned on the basis of the federal tax
rates on labor income and proﬁts.
This paper extends the contribution of Dahlby and Wilson (2003) in two directions.
First, the second-best outcome is replicated here with the federal government behaving
as a Stackelberg leader; it implies a more elaborate framework than that of Dahlby
and Wilson (2003), with the federal government moving ﬁrst and taking account the
states’ reaction functions with respect to the federal policy variables. Second, their
ﬁnding (in their Proposition 3) that the vertical tax and expenditure externalities are







discussing in terms of the bias in the provision of public inputs and its relationship with
the tax externality as they do, I use separately two conditions neutralizing both vertical
externalities by replicating the second-best outcome.
Therefore, this paper shows how the federal government can replicate the second-
best unitary outcome in the provision of public inputs. The highest level of government
sets an optimal tax rate on labor income, whose sign depends on the elasticity of marginal
productivity of public input to employment: if this is elastic, the federal government
should tax the labor income; if inelastic, the federal government ought to subsidize this
tax base. Additionally, the paper ﬁnds that both vertical externalities have to be faced
by the federal government independently each other.
After this Introduction the paper sets up the general framework of the model.
Section 3 obtains the optimal solutions for the provision of public inputs and public
goods in a unitary country, serving us as a benchmark which can be compared with the
ﬁscal decisions taken by states in a federal country. Section 4 describes how the federal
government can replicate the unitary outcome, and ﬁnally section 5 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
The model I use is simple and well-known from Boadway and Keen (1996), in which
two levels of government occupy the same tax bases on labor. However, by contrast to
Boadway and Keen (1996), two new relevant features are included here. First, instead
of using speciﬁc taxes on labor, I consider ad valorem taxes on labor income. In such a
case, the vertical tax externality can be positive and overlapping tax bases may result
in ineﬃciently low tax rates. Second, this paper deals with public inputs, aﬀecting
productivity of labor, which means scope for vertical expenditure externalities. In a
sense, the theoretical framework I present here is a mix between Boadway and Keen
(1996) and Dahlby and Wilson (2003).
Particularly, I characterize a model where diﬀerent levels of government provide
two types of public expenditure. The federal country consists of k (symmetric) states,
populated by nk identical, but immobile, households. Each representative household has
the following utility function:
u(x,l)+B(G), (1)
where x is a private good (and numeraire), l is labor, and G is a federal public good. The
sub-utility u(x,l) has the usual properties (quasi-concave, increasing in x and decreasing
in l)a n dB(G) is increasing and concave.
The representative consumer maximizes (1) subject to the constraint x =( 1 −τ)wl,







the labor supply l(¯ w),w h e r e¯ w =( 1− τ)w is net wage. It is assumed that l0(¯ w) > 0.1
Indirect utility is then given by v(¯ w)=u(¯ wl(¯ w),l(¯ w)),w i t hv0 = uxl by Roy’s identity.
E a c hs t a t ei se n d o w e dw i t ht h es a m ea m o u n to fs o m eﬁxed factor. Output in
each state is produced by applying the services of labor and public input to the ﬁxed
factor according to the technology f(nl,g),w i t hg being the state public input. This
production function has the usual properties fL,f g,f Lg > 0, fLg = fgL and fLL,f gg < 0,
with L = nl. Output can be costlessly used for x, g and G. The private sector maximizes
proﬁts, given by π = f(L,g) − wL, and thus chooses labor demand that satisﬁes
fL(L,g)=w (2)
On this basis, and given l(¯ w), the equilibrium gross wage rate w((1 − τ),n,g) can be
obtained. For later use, it can be proved that wτ > 0 and wg > 0. The positive sign of
wτ comes from diﬀerentiating totally (2):
−fLLnl
0w + fLLnl
0(1 − τ)wτ − wτ =0 . (3)
Solving for wτ gives
wτ =
−fLLnl0w
1 − fLLnl0(1 − τ)
, (4)
which is positive given the properties of the production function. The positive sign of
wg is obtained through a similar way. Diﬀerentiating totally (2) we have:
fLg + fLLnl
0(1 − τ)wg − wg =0 ,
which solving for wg gives:
wg =
fLg
1 − fLLnl0(1 − τ)
, (5)
that is positive on the basis of the properties of the production function.
Comparative statics on proﬁts (rents) π gives:
πτ = −nlwτ < 0. (6)
πg = fg − nl[fLg +( 1− τ)fLLnl
0wg] ≶ 0. (7)
The underlying intuition behind the ambiguity in the sign of (7) is clear. Additional
units of public input increase production, and consequently π, but the positive eﬀect of
g on wages through improving labor productivity may decline the rents2.
1A subscript denotes the derivative of a function of several variables whereas a prime denotes the
derivative of a function of one variable.
2I tc a nb ep r o v e dt h a tπg is always positive with a Cobb-Douglas technology. In general, only for
values of the elasticity of the marginal product of the public input with respect to labor input higher






  3 Governments and vertical externalities
As is usual in ﬁscal federalism literature, the analysis now aims at obtaining the equi-
librium solution which would be achieved by a unitary country. This will serve as a
benchmark for eﬃciency comparisons when ﬁscal policies are chosen by diﬀerent levels
of government. Equilibrium in a unitary country involves maximization of v(¯ w)+B(G),
choosing τ,G,g, subject to the consolidated budget constraint G + kg = nkτw((1 −
τ),n,g)l(¯ w)+π((1 − τ),n,g).
From the ﬁrst order conditions of this optimization problem, it is straightforward
to show that the optimality rules for the provision of the national public good G and









Equation (8) simply states that at the unitary optimum the tax rate τ is set such
that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the federal and the private
good x must be equal to the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF), given by 1/(1 −
(τwl0/l)). Equation (9) is the condition for production eﬃciency in the public sector,
familiar from Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). In essence, it means that, at optimum, the
marginal productivity of the public input is just equal to its marginal cost of production,
which is 1 in the present model; and that occurs in spite of using distortionary taxation.
I turn now to the characterization of the equilibrium when diﬀerent levels of gov-
ernment are involved in deciding on ﬁscal policy. Under the new federal structure for
the country, each state government provides the local public input g,w h i c hi sﬁnanced
by taxing, at the rate t,l a b o ri n c o m ewl. The federal government provides the national
public good G, ﬁnanced by taxing labor income at the rate T. Consolidated taxation is
denoted by τ ≡ t+T.P r o ﬁts π are taxable by the federal government, at a ﬁxed rate θ,
and by the state governments at the rate of (1 − θ).D e n o t i n gb yS the vertical transfer,
the state public input is then given by
g(t,T,τ,S,n,θ)=ntw((1−τ),n,g)l[(1−τ)w((1−τ),n,g))]+(1−θ)π((1 − τ),n,g)+S,
(10)










GT = nkwl + nkTwτl + nkTwl
0((1 − τ)wτ − w)+kθπτ, (12)
Gt = nkTwτl + nkTwl
0((1 − τ)wτ − w)+kθπτ, (13)
Gg = nkTwg(l + wl
0(1 − τ)) + kθπg (14)
GS = −k<0. (15)
Notice, from (12) and (13), that GT = nkwl + Gt. Equations (13) and (14) are central
to the present analysis. They show the eﬀects of states’ ﬁscal decisions on the federal
budget constraint, i. e. they are measures of the two vertical externalities existing in the
model. The signs of both of them are indeterminate here because ad valorem taxation
and the provision of public inputs at state level may increase or decrease the federal
revenues (Dahlby and Wilson, 2003).
Nevertheless, the best way of showing how the equilibrium in a federal country
moves away from the second-best solution is to discuss the case in which state govern-
ments behave as Nash players. In such a situation, each state government ignores the
impact of its ﬁscal decisions on federal revenues and, consequently, vertical externalities
are expected to appear.
The typical state chooses (t,g)t om a x i m i z ev(¯ w)+B(G) subject to (10), taking as
given n, θ and the decision variables of the federal government (T,S,G). The necessary
conditions of this are given by
[(1 − T)nl +( 1− τ)(T − θ)n
2lfLLl
0
]wg +( 1− θ)(fg − nlwg) − 1=0≡ Ω (16)
g − ntwl − (1 − θ)π − S =0≡ Ψ, (17)
where (16) comes from manipulations on the ﬁrst order conditions for t and g,a n d
(17) from the state’s budget constraint (10). Obviously, the condition for production
eﬃciency in the provision of the public input does not hold at this scenario, and this is
an indication of the existence of a vertical expenditure externality. Anyway, consistently
with intuition, the condition fg =1is trivially achieved when T = θ =0is imposed in
(16), that is, when only one level of government is considered.
4 Equilibrium with the federal government behaving
as Stackelberg
Consider now the federal government is assumed to be able to act as ﬁrst mover (or







on states’ behavior. Before focussing on the problem of federal government, a charac-
terization of the response of states to federal policy variables is needed. With this aim,
I take as basis the expressions (16) and (17). Both of them implictly deﬁne the states’
reaction function
t = ξ (T,θ,S,n) (18)
g = γ(T,θ,S,n). (19)
Diﬀerentiating totally (16) and (17) we obtain a two-equation system which provides
information on comparative statics of states’ reaction function:
gT = Λ(ΨtΩT − ΩtΨT) (20)
gS = Λ(ΨtΩS − ΩtΨS) (21)
tT = Λ(−ΨgΩT + ΩgΨT) (22)
tS = Λ(−ΨgΩS + ΩgΨS), (23)
where Λ = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt,a n dΩt and Ωg are the second order conditions of the state
government optimization problem.
The federal government chooses (T,S), and residually G,t om a x i m i z ev(¯ w)+B(G)
subject to (11) and the states’ reaction functions (18) and (19). First order conditions
for T and S are respectively:
ΓV
0





+( GS + GttS + GggS)B
0
=0 , (25)


















where the conditions Gt = Gg =0have been imposed. Solving (27) for fg =1 ,t h e












where Eg is the elasticity of marginal productivity of g with respect to employment.
The sign of T∗ depends on the value of Eg;p a r t i c u l a r l y ,T∗ R 0 when Eg R 1.T h e
more intense the complement relationship between labor and public inputs, the higher
the optimal federal tax rate. While Dahlby and Wilson (2003) suggest a matching grant
for correcting both vertical externalities, this paper provides an alternative policy tool
based on the asymmetry of government behaviors at state and federal levels.
Additionally, conditions Gt = Gg =0appear as suﬃcient to achieve the unitary
outcome3. Note that Dahlby and Wilson (2003) and Kotsogiannis and Martínez (2007)
show that both conditions characterize the second-best solution with ad valorem taxation
for the provision of public inputs and public goods, respectively. In this sense, I have
conﬁrmed that both vertical externalities are independent each other as long as the
federal government neutralizes the eﬀect of sharing taxation and the impact of state
public input on its revenues dealing with both externalities separately. The rule for
replicating the second-best solution does not consist of taking account a combination
of Gt and Gg (which should be zero), but the federal government cancels out the tax
externality Gt =0and the expenditure externality Gg =0without considering reciprocal
links between both of them. And this is done with the federal tax rate conveniently
chosen. To summarize:
Proposition 1 The federal government facing vertical tax and expenditure externali-
ties replicates the unitary solution with the optimal federal tax rate T∗ = θ
Eg−1
Eg .M o r e
speciﬁcally,
(a) if the marginal productivity of g to employment is elastic, then the federal
government taxes labor income.
(b) if the marginal productivity of g to employment is inelastic, then the federal
government subsidizes labor income, and
(c) both vertical externalities are independent each other.
5 Concluding remarks
The study of vertical expenditure externalities has not been so intense as the case of
vertical tax externalities. However, the real federations show a number of cases in which
the public spending decided by one level of government aﬀects revenues of other levels
of government. Public investment constitutes a good example of this, with extensions
beyond national federations, namely, the structural funds ﬁnanced by the European
Union and impacting on federal, regional and local budgets.
3Assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function, it can be numerically proved that the conditions Gt =







This paper has dealt with a model in which vertical expenditures externalities
appear in a federal country with taxes on rents and ad valorem taxation on labor income.
State governments provide a public input aﬀecting federal government’s revenues, which
in turn are used to ﬁnance a national public good. It is clear that the unitary government
would achieve the second-best outcome in the provision of both public expenditures,
that in the case of public inputs means holding the production eﬃciency condition. But
when diﬀerent levels of government are involved in policy decisions, vertical externalities
damage eﬃciency.
A way of correcting them is to assume that the federal government behaves as
Stackelberg leader, that is, moving ﬁrst by deciding its ﬁscal policy and taking account
the reaction of states to changes in federal variables. The result is the optimal federal tax
rate, which crucially depends on the elasticity of marginal productivity of public input
to employment. The higher this elasticity, the more likely to have a positive federal tax
rate. Moreover, this paper conﬁrms a previous result on the absence of links between
both vertical externalities.
Some policy implications can be derived from this. First, information appears
as a relevant point for designing optimal federal policies. This information does not
only consists of the behavior of subnational governments when face changes in federal
policy variables, but also of the economic features and impact of expenditures decided
by state governments. Note that the optimal federal tax rate found in this paper is
closely related to the way through which the state public input enters the production
function. Second, the power of federal government to replicate the second-best outcome
dramatically depends on its ability to become a Stackelberg leader. This contrasts with
some real cases of federations in which the federal government behaves as a Nash player,
in line with the behavior assumed in this paper for states. In a sense, one can guess that
a strong federal government is a necessary condition for avoiding ineﬃcient decisions on
public spending.
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THESE APPENDICES ARE NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendices
Appendix A
Derivation of equations (8) and (9) in text.
In this Appendix I derive the optimal rules for the provision of the public good G and
the public input g in a unitary country.
The maximization problem for the unitary government is to maximize v(¯ w)+B(G),
choosing τ, G and g, and subject to the consolidated budget constraint as given by
G + kg = nkτw((1 − τ),n,g)l(¯ w)+π((1 − τ),n,g). (A.1)
Denoting by μ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, necessary
conditions of this maximization problem are given by
(τ): v
0((1 − τ)wτ − w)+μA =0 , (A.2)
(G): B
0(G) − μ =0 , (A.3)
(g): v
0((1 − τ)wτ − w)+μB =0 , (A.4)
where
A ≡ nkwl + τnkwτl + τnkwl
0((1 − τ)wτ − w)+kπτ, (A.5)
and
B ≡− k + nklτwg + τnkwl
0(1 − τ)wg + kπg. (A.6)
Note also that πτ can be re-written as
πτ =
fLLn2l0wl
1 − fLLnl(1 − τ)
< 0. (A.7)
Notice now that we also have (4) and, following from the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition
fL(L,g)=w,t h a t
l
0(w)=1 /(nfLL(L,g)). (A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into (4), and that and (A.7) into (A.5) and simplifying, one arrives
at
A ≡ kn((1 − τ)wτ − w)(τwl
0 − l). (A.9)
Making use now of the fact that v0 = uxl and (A.9), straightforward manipulation of the







For the case of the optimal rule of the public input (9), manipulation of the ﬁrst








where the expresions (A.7) and (4) have been used again. Substituting (5) and (7) into
(A.10), the production eﬃciency condition (9) is obtained.
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Appendix B
Derivation of equation (16) in text.
In this Appendix I derive one of the equations deﬁning the optimal rules for the provision
of public input g by a state government in a federal country.
The maximization problem for the state government is to maximize v(¯ w)+B(G),c h o o s -
ing t and g, and subject to the state budget constraint (10). Denoting by μ the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the budget constraint, the ﬁrst order conditions for t and g
are given by
(t): v
0((1 − τ)wτ − w) − μC =0 , (B.1)
(g): v
0((1 − τ)wg)+μD =0 , (B.2)
where C = nwl+ntwτl+ntwl0((1−τ)wτ −w)+(1−θ)πτ and D = −ntwgl−ntwl0(1−




l((1 − τ)wτ − w)D
C
.
Dividing the top and the bottom of the RHS of above expression by l((1 − τ)wτ − w)
and making use of (A.7), (4), (7) and (5), the expression (16) is obtained.
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Appendix C
Derivation of expressions (20), (21), (22) and (23) in text.
Diﬀerentiating totally (16) and (17), I have:
Ωgdg + Ωtdt + ΩTdT + ΩSdS =0 (C.1)









































Matricial manipulations on (C.3) show that
gT = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt(ΨtΩT − ΩtΨT) (C.4)
gS = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt(ΨtΩS − ΩtΨS) (C.5)
tT = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt(−ΨgΩT − ΩgΨT) (C.6)
tS = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt(−ΨgΩS − ΩgΨS) (C.7)
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Appendix D
Derivation of expression (28) in the text




− Φ =0 . (D.1)
Given GT = nkwl + Gt and the expressions of wτ and wg, (D.1) can be rewritten as
1





(−w(1 + tT)+( 1− τ)fLggT)+wtS − (1 − τ)fLggS
¸
=0 .
It is clear that the ﬁrst term of this expression is non-zero, then the expression inside
brackets must be zero. Upon using the comparative statics of the states’ reaction func-








where Λ = − 1
ΩgΨt−ΨgΩt and the facts that ΩS =0 , Ωt = ΩT + nlfLg and ΨT = Ψt + nwl
have been used. Given that Λ 6=0 , solving the expression inside parentheses in (D.2) for
fg =1 ,o n eo b t a i n s
T
∗ = θ
Eg − 1
Eg
,
where Eg =
nlfLg
fg .
¤
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